REGULATING EXCESSIVE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
—WHY BOTHER?
By
Jerry W. Markham1

“The thing that differentiates animals and man is money.”
Gertrude Stein

I
INTRODUCTION

Executive compensation at publicly owned companies has long been the target of
corporate governance reformers. In the 1930s, those advocates attacked excess
compensation in lawsuits which claimed that executives were breaching their fiduciary
duties by allowing such payments. That effort was unsuccessful in curbing executive pay,
as was an attempt by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to shame
executives into accepting lower payments through its full disclosure regulations. In the
1980s, reformers focused on options as a means of aligning the interests of executives
and shareholders through performance based incentive compensation. It was thought that
this would incentive the executive to boost the company’s stock price and thereby benefit
shareholders in the process. That effort was aided by Congress through tax incentives, but
this initiative too proved to be a failure, a spectacular one.
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This article traces these reform efforts, describes how they failed and how,
ironically, they actually encouraged abuses in executive compensation. It then describes
the most recent set of reforms that followed those abuses and explains why they too will
only encourage ever greater compensation. Finally, the article addresses the issue of
whether executive compensation should be taken out of the hands of the reformers and
left to the marketplace, ever how inefficient it might be.

II

FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND FULL DISCLOSURE

Fiduciary Duties
Corporate governance reformists have long focused their attention on executive
compensation as a measure of abuse by management and loss by shareholders. This
movement seems to have had its genesis in the landmark work of Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means in the 1930s.2 They observed that public companies with dispersed
shareholders were experiencing a separation of ownership and control, with control being
vested in managers. Berle and Means were concerned that the managers would be
tempted to manage for their own interests, rather than those of the owner-shareholders. A
principal concern was that those managers would compensate themselves excessively
whatever their performance as managers.
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Economists of that era were also contending that limits should be placed on
executive compensation, asserting that no man could be worth $1 million per year. That
pronouncement came after the stock market excesses of the 1920s, which had also
witnessed a steep increase in executive compensation.3 “By 1928, the executives of some
of our largest companies were receiving compensation running as high as $1,000,000 or
$1,500,000 annually.”4 The fiduciary duty concept was used to challenge one particularly
large compensation scheme during that era. In Rogers v. Hill,5 the Supreme Court held
that a compensation scheme could become excessive where it provided large, unexpected
windfall profits to executives at the American Tobacco Company.
The American Tobacco Company plan attacked in that proceeding, which had
been approved by shareholders, provided executives with a bonus of 10 percent of
earnings increases over a bench mark amount. A steep increase in cigarette consumption
led to large profits to the executives subject to the plan. The president received
$842,000in 1930 as a bonus plus his salary of $168,000. This payout came just as the
Great Depression was settling on the country. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court struggled
to determine what measure to use in determining that compensation was excessive. A
subsequent challenge to that compensation scheme led a New York court to simply throw
up its hands on the issue.6
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Another high profile challenges to executive pay was directed at Bethlehem Steel
in 1931.7 The executive at the center of that storm was Charles M. Schwab. He had
helped Andrew Carnegie with the sale of his steel mills to U.S. Steel as the Twentieth
Century began. U.S. Steel then became the first $1 billion company and the largest
business enterprise in the world. As a reward for his efforts, Schwab was made the head
of that giant enterprise at then unbelievable annual salary of $1 million. Schwab was a
big spender known for his appearances at casinos at Monte Carlo. He built a house on
New York’s Riverside Drive at a cost of nearly $4 million. That residence included its
own swimming pool, gym and power plant.8
After quarrelling with his board at U.S. Steel, Schwab took control of Bethlehem
Steel Co., and turned it into an industry giant.9 Schwab created a bonus system at
Bethlehem Steel that paid executives over $6 million between 1911 and 1929. Those
payments were challenged by shareholders as being excessive and in breach of the
board’s fiduciary duties.10 That effort met only limited success through a settlement.11
Another high visibility attack on excess executive pay occurred in 1934. This was
a challenge to the compensation paid to the chief executive officer (“CEO”) at the
National City Bank, Charles Mitchell, who had been paid $1.4 million in 1928 as a
bonus.12 Mitchell was somewhat infamous by the time of this challenge, having been
charged with income tax fraud for using a stock buyback scheme with his wife. That bit
of legerdemain allowed him to evade paying taxes on over $1 million in income in 1929.
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That case went to the Supreme Court, and Mitchell and avoided jail but did have to pay
taxes on the sales.13
Mitchell was carrying other baggage. Before being promoted to lead the National
City Bank, Mitchell had headed its broker-dealer subsidiary that became infamous for
high pressure sales programs that were promoting worthless securities. Those operations
led to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act that required the separation of commercial
and investment banking.14 Mitchell was also responsible for legislation strengthening the
Federal Reserve Board in Washington after he defied their efforts to raise interest rates to
cool the stock market bubble in the 1920s.15 Yet, despite his reputation, the challenge to
Mitchell’s pay at the bank was successful only in establishing that certain incentive
compensation had been wrongly computed.16
In the wake of these cases, one professor noted that, while it was being said that
“‘no man can be worth $1,000,000 a year.’ Perhaps this is true. Perhaps not. In any event,
it is hardly a matter for courts and lawyers to settle.”17 This professor also noted that, by
1941, the courts had declined to determine what level of compensation was appropriate:
In effect, they put aside the problem of ‘reasonableness’ and simply ask: ‘Is
this corporation being honestly and fairly run by its directors, with observance of
the formal requirements of the law?’ If the answer is in the affirmative, the
judgment of the directors as to the amount of compensation which should be paid
to the executives will be allowed to control.18
Another challenge to executive compensation was mounted in the 1950s at the
Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp. There, the founder of the company successfully
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challenged a large payout to the chairman. That success was not achieved through a
lawsuit. Rather, a proxy fight was waged that was successful in ousting the chairman.
However, that was an expensive campaign in which the shareholders ended up paying the
expenses of both sides and such efforts were not widely repeated.19 In fact, claims over
excessive compensation seem to have been pretty much removed from the courts until a
recent challenge that involved the payment of $130 million to Michael Ovitz by the Walt
Disney Company.
Ovitz received that payment even though he was terminated after only fourteen
months on the job. The Delaware Supreme Court could find no breach of fiduciary duties
by the Walt Disney directors in negotiating the employment contract that provided for
that massive severance payment for so little work.20 Of course, this was not the only case
of excessive compensation at Walt Disney. Michael Eisner at Walt Disney Co. was paid
over $750 million while he was making some colossal management blunders as head of
the company.21 Another executive, Jeffrey Katzenberg, was paid $285 million by Disney
to settle his compensation claims.22
SEC Full Disclosure
The federal securities laws are premised on the theory that disclosure will not
only allow an informed business judgment but will also deter abusive practices by
corporate managers.23 In the famous words of Louis Brandeis “sunlight is said to be the
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best of disinfectants, electric light the most efficient policeman.”24 As also noted by Felix
Frankfurter, one of the architects of the Securities Act of 1933,25 that legislation was
intended to have an “in terrorem” effect on corporate managers and that:
The existence of bonuses, of excessive commissions and salaries, of preferential
lists and the like, may all be open secrets among the knowing, but the knowing
are few. There is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to force knowledge of
them into the open is largely to restrain their happening.26
Thus one of the principal targets of reform through the federal securities laws was
excess executive compensation. That effort was spurred by corporate executives who
increased their salaries to compensate for reduction in profit based bonuses after the
Stock Market Crash of 1929. Those increases came while thousands of employees were
being laid off and rendered destitute.27 Congress then ordered the Federal Trade
Commission and the Internal Revenue Service to conduct a survey and collect data on
executive compensation, which was then published annually. As will be seen, taxes were
also increased greatly. Companies paying executives more than $17,500 were denied
certain government contracts, and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (“RFC”) was
prohibited from making loans to companies that were deemed to be over-paying their
executives.28
As another effort to curb executive excesses, the Securities Act of 1933 was
intended to make full disclosure mandatory in public offerings. The statute included
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schedules setting forth disclosures required to be included in prospectuses.29 Section 14
of Schedule A (for domestic companies) required disclosure of the compensation of
officers and directors for the prior year and the year following the offering if such
compensation was in excess of $25,000.30 Section 10 of that schedule also required the
identification of any options on the company’s stock and the identity of the holders.31 As
originally enacted, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 additionally required companies
traded on stock exchanges to disclose the compensation of officer and directors and
persons other than directors and officers exceeding $20,000 per year.32 Bonus and profit
sharing arrangements had to be disclosed,33 as well as options issued on the registrant’s
stock.34
In 1938, the SEC adopted executive compensation disclosure requirements for
proxy statements.35 The SEC, thereafter, periodically adjusted its various compensation
disclosure requirements.36 In 1978, for example, it required disclosure of all direct and
indirect compensation in tabular form, including options. In 1980, the agency amended
its rules to require disclosure of the amounts of unexercised options. In 1983, the SEC
acted again on executive compensation, adopting a narrative approach to such
disclosures. The amendments required disclosure only of the net value realized from the
exercise of options.37
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In 1992, the SEC adopted significant revisions to its disclosure requirements that
moved from narrative disclosure approach to formatted tabular disclosures. The SEC also
joined the then ongoing executive compensation reform crusade and tried to discourage
excessive compensation through disclosures that would presumably shame executives
from seeking large payouts. The rules adopted by the SEC, among other things, required
disclosure of the compensation of the CEO and the other top four highest paid managers.
The compensation committee was also required to describe the performance factors it
used in setting the compensation of the CEO and a discussion of its policies with respect
to other executive officer compensation. The company had to disclose the hypothetical
value of option grants using the Black-Scholes model or some other valuation method. In
addition, the performance of the company’s stock had to be compared to that of an index
of stocks such as the S&P 500 Composite Price Stock Index.38
The SEC’s disclosure regulations did not curb executive compensation packages.
Rather, they only encouraged competition for ever larger packages, and disclosure
actually made legitimate even the most excessive payments, i.e., because it was disclosed
there was no wrongdoing.39 One study noted that during the period 1993 to 2003
executive:
pay has grown much beyond the increase that could be explained by changes in
firm size, performance and industry classification. Had the relationship of
compensation to size, performance and industry classification remained the same
in 2003 as it was in 1993, mean compensation in 2003 would have been only
about half of its actual size.40
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As will be seen, the SEC’s full disclosure system also corrupted a large portion of
corporate America as executives sought to meet the expectations of financial analysts and
boost stock prices so that those executives could reap large profits from incentive
programs.
III
TAX LAWS AND OPTIONS

The Tax Laws
Another method used for attacking excessive compensation has been the federal
tax laws, which after the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, allowed the use of
“progressive” income taxes. The first tax under that amendment was levied in 1913 at a
rate of 7 percent on those few Americans with incomes of over $500,000.41 However, tax
rates on the wealthy were raised during the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt until
they were virtually confiscatory. Roosevelt used the income tax as a part of his effort to
conduct class warfare, using a populist attack against wealthy executives as the core of
his campaign platform and legislative programs. The top tax rate was raised in 1932 from
63 percent from 25 percent. A tax bill introduced in 1935, called the “soak-the-rich” bill,
raised the top rate to 79 percent.42 That legislation and other attacks on business by the
Roosevelt administration sent the country back into another depression, just as it seemed
to be recovering from the horrors of prior years.43
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The top tax rate reached 91 percent at the end of World War II but was lowered to
70 percent in 1963.44 That reduction was part of a “reform” effort by President John F.
Kennedy who thought that lower rates would remove incentives for tax avoidance and
evasion and allow the closing of loopholes used by the wealthy to reduce their taxes.
Ironically, Republicans, including former President Dwight D. Eisenhower opposed the
Kennedy cuts, claiming that they were irresponsible in light of large budget deficits.45
However, even after the Kennedy reductions, executives had little incentive to take risks
to increase their wealth. Where risks were taken successfully, the resulting high tax rates
were avoided or evaded by many wealthy individuals through abusive tax shelters,
foundations and other means.46 The “death” tax, or “estate” tax as it is called by
proponents, was another effort to seize the wealth accumulated by executives during their
careers on which they had already been taxed at near confiscatory rates. The death tax
seized fifty percent of the decedent’s estate in excess of specified amounts.47 It too was
avoided by various schemes. Still another tax, the alternate minimum tax (“AMT”), was
passed to assure that executives paidt least a minimum amount of tax whatever tax
shelters might be available. That tax was passed after it was reveled that twenty one
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millionaires had paid no taxes in 1967.48 Of course, like many financial “reforms,” there
were unintended consequences. The AMT is now increasing the tax burden on many
middle class households.49
Unfortunately for the reformers, the high rate of income tax set by the Roosevelt
and succeeding administrations offended Ronald Reagan, the Hollywood actor who rose
to become President of the United States. He touched off a movement to roll the top
marginal tax rates back, and this effort has become a pillar of the Republican Party.50
Reagan believed in “supply side” economics which posits that lower taxes will spur
greater economic activity. These theorists also point to the “Laffer curve” to support the
argument that lower taxes can even result in more tax revenues through increased
economic growth. They further note that with lower tax rates there will be less incentive
to avoid or evade taxes51 Under Reagan, personal income taxes were cut by 25 percent
and capital gains taxes went from 28 percent to 20 percent.52
George H.W. Bush, who succeeded Reagan, was removed from office by voters
after he failed to keep his pledge (“read my lips”) not to raise taxes and experienced a
recession that tax cuts might have mitigated.53 Although Reagan’s views on taxes had
many adherents, large spending deficits led to the successful effort by the administration
of William Clinton to raise taxes. That increase appeared to have little effect on a
booming economy and stock market until it crashed in 2000.
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Learning from his father’s experience, George W. Bush successfully ran for
President on two occasions by seeking tax cuts for the wealthy, as well as others. He was
opposed by Democratic candidates who sought to engender class warfare by seeking
more taxes on wealthy corporate executives.54 Bush overcame those opponents and has
been particularly successful in pushing back tax rates that have fallen chiefly on wealthy
executives. He even achieved a phase out, albeit a temporary one, of the death tax.55
Despite some rocky times, including a near recession that he inherited from the Clinton
administration, the 9/11 attacks and corporate scandals, the economy has remained strong
under his administration. Many point to the tax cuts as having assured that result.
Bush was supported by the fact that the wealthy pay more than their proportionate
share of taxes. The top one percent of taxpayers (those making over $313,000 annually)
paid 37.4 percent of federal income taxes in 2000 but collectively received only about
twenty-one percent of the Nation’s adjusted gross income. The top five percent of income
earners were paying fifty-five percent of personal federal income taxes while receiving
only thirty-four percent of adjusted gross income.56
Those statistics suggest that wealthy businessmen are being punished enough
under the tax code. That fact and the current political environment will make tax
increases a hard sell by reformers seeking to curb excessive compensation through
increased taxes. However, even if higher taxes could be passed, it is likely, as seen from
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past efforts, that they will be avoided or evaded. It is also noteworthy that other efforts to
regulate compensation by taxes have proved to be failures.
Golden Parachutes
After failing in the courts and losing the battle over progressive tax rates,
corporate governance reformers looked elsewhere for a means to limit executive
compensation. “Golden parachutes” were one subject of their attacks. These were large
payouts to corporate executives in the event their company was taken over. The theory in
support of these payments was that the executive would be too worried about his future
from the threat of a potentially hostile takeover to concentrate on the business.
Presumably, the golden parachute would remove that concern. In actual practice, these
payments acted as a deterrent to hostile takeovers since, if pulled, the executives would
leave the company with their golden parachutes, robbing it of needed management and
draining the treasury in the process.
Bowing to the reformers, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code in 1984
to prohibit the deduction of golden parachutes where the payments totaled more than
three times the executive’s average annual compensation. A 20 percent excise tax was
also imposed on the executives receiving such payments.57 There was, however, more
than one way to milk a cow. Executives were allowed to make huge profits from their
stockholdings in negotiated mergers, which they proceeded to do after adopting other
poison pills to ward off unwonted suitors.
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Steve Ross at Warner Brothers pocketed almost $200 million in its merger with
Time Inc. in 1989.58 More recently, a scheduled payout to James Kilts of over $180
million after the merger of Gillette and Proctor Gamble raised howls of outrage.59 Carly
Fiorina received a $42 million severance package after it appeared that the merger she
had engineered between Hewlett-Packard Co. and the Compaq Computer Corp. was
faltering.60 Wallace Barr, CEO at Caesars Entertainment was paid $20 million after his
company was taken over by Harrahs. That amount seemed paltry as compared to other
such payments but was criticized anyway in the press.61
Options
The 1980s witnessed another reform effort that sought to align shareholder
interests with those of management through options grants.62 Led by Michael Jensen at
the Harvard Business School and Kevin Murphy at University of Rochester, these
theorists believed that options would provide management with an incentive to work
harder in order to increase the price of the stock, thereby benefiting shareholders. This
theory was premised on the belief that managers being paid only a large salary would
have no incentive to work hard and would spend their days on the golf course.63 Despite
the possibility that they might be induced to cut their time on the links, this theory met
widespread acceptance even among corporate executives. The SEC thus noted in 1992
that options were one of the
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most rapidly growing areas of executive compensation. Recent studies indicate
that more than 90% of the leading 200 American industrial and service
corporations, respectively, compensate their executives through awards of stock
options.64
Options, at least until recent years, had another advantage for executives. Unlike a
salary, these awards were not treated as an expense on the company’s books. This meant
that option grants had no effect on earnings, no matter how large the profits received by
the executive from the options upon their exercise. This was significant because earnings
drive stock prices. If compensated in cash, those earnings would be hurt by the associated
expense. Compensation schemes at public companies were soon restructured to cap
salaries at $1 million and use options as the principal basis for executive pay. The result
was that about 80 percent of executive compensation was being paid in options as the this
century began.65
The employment of options as the primary basis for compensation did not curb
the amount of compensation being paid to executives. Indeed, overall executive
compensation increased by 450 per cent in the 1990s.66 At the CEO level, compensation
witnessed an even more startling increase of 2,500 percent during that period.67 CEOs
were increasingly being given “mega-grants” of options and when those ran out they
were replaced by “reload” options, and when stock prices dropped their exercise price
was “reset” to a lower level.68 To name a few benefiting from mega-grants, Larry Ellison,
the head of Oracle Corp., made $706 million on his options. Sanford Weill at Citigroup
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was paid a total of almost $1 billion, and Michael Dell of Dell Computer was $233
million for a single year of labor.69
In order to limit this money grab, reformers sought to require public companies to
expense option grants. This would have had the effect of reducing earnings and would
have adversely affected stock prices, making it harder for executives to profit from large
option grants.70 This idea caught the attention of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (“FASB”), which floated a proposal that would have required options to be
expensed. The options expensing idea met stiff resistance, however, especially from the
so-called dot.com companies of that era that were using option awards to attract and
retain talented employees. Claims were also made that it would be difficult to value the
options for purposes of expensing. This controversy led to:
a public rally to demonstrate the grassroots support for stock options. Kathleen
Brown, the California treasurer and daughter of a storied Democratic governor,
shouted to a cheering crowd, ‘Give stock a chance!’ (It was, presumably, the first
mass rally against an accounting standard since the birth of double-entry
bookkeeping).71
The United States Senate also passed a resolution condemning the proposal to expense
options in May of 1994 by an overwhelming majority.72 That opposition led the FASB to
retreat from that proposal.
Option Scandals
Congress sought to aid the corporate governance options movement through the
Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993.73 That legislation prohibited corporations
69
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from deducting more than $1 million for the salary of a CEO or for the salary of four
other of the highest compensated employees without shareholder approval.74 Performance
based compensation was excluded from the prohibition on deductions of over $1 million
in salary.75 This was intended to push executives toward options as compensation and
thereby align their interests with those of shareholders. However, as the present SEC
chairman recently and ruefully noted: “[t]his tax law change deserves pride of place in
the Museum of Unintended Consequences.”76 This was because, while it had the
predictable effect of steering executives into options because they were performance
based and exempt from the $1 million salary limitation on deductibility, it had the
unexpected effect of inducing massive accounting manipulations.
Ironically, the reason for the overhaul of the SEC’s executive compensation
disclosure rules in 1992 was its view that:
contemporary focus is increasingly on long-term compensation to provide
management with incentives to create shareholder value. This trend toward
increased use of long-term stock compensation reflects the commonly held view
that ‘real ownership builds commitment and risk on the part of executives and
positively influences long-term decision-making.’ Recently, these changes have
accelerated, with long-term incentive compensation overtaking the more
traditional fixed salary and bonus to become the largest single component of the
total mix of the typical executive pay package. The growing use and multiplicity
of these plans have made executive pay packages extremely complex, and have
led to reporting of compensation that many shareholders find incomprehensible.77
In fact, executives were becoming increasingly focused on short term
management of quarterly earnings reports in order to meet analysts’ expectations. Stock
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prices thus had to rise before executives could profit from their option grants. Those
stock price increases were largely dependent on the views of financial analysts that
followed the company. Those analysts focused on the company’s quarterly financial
reports.78 A failure to meet even one quarter’s “consensus” earnings estimates by analysts
caused a sharp decline in a company’s stock, which undercut the profit on executive
stock options.
This constant demand for quarterly increases in earnings had the undesirable
effect of focusing management’s attention on short term goals rather than long range
initiatives that might be a drag on earnings for some considerable period of time before
becoming profitable. This problem was not widely recognized until July 2006, when the
Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics called for the end of quarterly
guidance given by executives to analysts. That body stated that quarterly earnings goals
had become an obsession and was diverting attention from long range goals and planning
at public companies.79 This fact should have been recognized even earlier.80 Enron Corp.
thus advised its shareholders in 2000, the year before its sensational collapse, that the
company was “laser focused on earnings per share.”81 There was good reason for that
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focus. In the year 2000, over 200 executives at Enron were paid more than $1 million in
compensation. In total, the Enron executives received $1.4 billion that year.82
Large businesses cannot be run on the premise of continually quarterly earnings.
There will be up quarters as the business grows over the years. Yet, financial analysts
demand constant quarterly growth. “Momentum” investors will shed a company’s stock
on the first occasion that analysts’ quarterly consensus estimates are not met. This
focused management on short term accounting ploys and operations at the loss of long
term strategic goals. This did not align shareholder values with those of management.
Rather, it produced unimaginable profits for management in the short term and massive
losses to investors in the long term.
The use of options as the principal basis for executive compensation had other
drawbacks. If the stock price did not go up, executives would have much reduced
compensation. That was not a major problem during the market run up in the latter part of
the 1990s, but where there was occasional pause in performance executives were often
given the opportunity to reset their option exercise prices at lower value.83 When that
failed, company accounts were manipulated in order to meet analysts’ expectations.
Those manipulations involved such things as “cookie jar reserves” and “channel stuffing”
as a means to “smooth” earnings.84 The restatement of company accounts became a daily
occurrence as these schemes fell apart in the market down turn at the end of the century.85
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Option grants to executives were at the center of the Enron Corp., WorldCom,
Inc. and other financial scandals that rocked the financial world after that downturn.86
Enron’s death spiral was completed after it announced that it was resting its earnings for
1997 to 2001 in the amount of $586 million.87 Waste Management Inc., announced a
more spectacular reduction of $1.32 billion.88 At WorldCom, the CEO and chief financial
officer inflated revenues by $1 billion in the third quarter of 2000 and $800 million in the
fourth quarter. Hundreds of millions of dollars were added in future quarters through
“close the gap” exercises before that company finally collapsed.89
Other companies involved in massive manipulations of their accounts included
Nortel Network Corp., Lucent Technologies, Qwest Communications International Inc.,
Global Crossing Ltd., AOL Time Warner, Inc., HealthSouth Corp., Fannie Mae, Freddie
Mac, Hollinger International, Vivendi Universal SA, Royal Ahold NV, and Parmalat
Finanziaria SpA.90 Charles Wang, CEO at Computer Associates International, was paid
$700 million in compensation tied to that company’s stock price, a record at the time.
However, it was later revealed that the company had engaged in a massive manipulation
of its accounts, adding over $2.5 billion that did not exist.91
The Enron and other scandals resulted in a new wave of reform in executive
compensation after it was revealed that Kenneth Lay, the head of Enron, had received
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$217 million in compensation between 1998 and 2001.92 His protégée, Jeffrey Skillling,
received $104 million during that same period.93 Much of that compensation was in the
form of options. Bernard Ebbes, the head of WorldCom, received the largest grant of
options received by any executive during the five year period before that company
collapsed.94
The FASB jumped in by revisiting the options expensing proposal after the Enron
era scandals and was able to adopt it after the opposition was weakened by those
scandals. That too did little to stem the growth of executive compensation. Although a
number of firms did stop granting options,95 a study at the University of Michigan
concluded that this requirement did not reduce the number of firms granting options to
executives, and grants were up some 24 percent.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform Act of 2002 was signed into law on July
30, 2002.96 That legislation created a new government oversight board over the
accounting industry and sought to strengthen internal management controls.97 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibited loans by public companies to management.98 This
provision was added after the disclosure of a “co-borrowing” arrangement between
Adelphia Communications and its controlling stockholders, the Rigas family of
Coudersport, Pennsylvania. The Rigas family took down some $3 billion under that
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arrangement to fund their extravagant lifestyle.99 Another big time borrower from his
corporation was Bernie Ebbers at WorldCom Inc. He received over $400 million in loans
from the company before its bankruptcy.100
Another provision in Sarbanes-Oxley required executives to forfeit their bonuses
if their company has to subsequently restate its financial statements.101 It was largely
ignored.102 The SEC was authorized to freeze “extraordinary” compensation payments at
companies involved in accounting manipulations.103 This too seems to have been inspired
by Bernie Ebbers who received an extraordinary compensation package when he was
terminated from WorldCom.104
In one case, the SEC sued Jean-Marie Messier, the former chairman of Vivendi
Universal and forced him to give up a $25 million termination package.105 In another
case, SEC v. Yuen,106 a Ninth Circuit panel held that a payment of $37.6 million in cash
and 6.7 million shares of stock to two executives at Gemstar-TV Guide Inc. were not
extraordinary, which meant that those payments could not be frozen pending an SEC
action charging the executives with inflating accounts. That decision was reversed in an
en banc decision of the Circuit Court.107
The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation caused public companies to incur massive costs
but seems to have little effect on the integrity of the accounting at public companies. A
new record was set in 2003 for the number of restatements of accounts in SEC filings,
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and accounting scandals continued to emerge.108 One study found 2,319 restatements
between 2003 and 2005.109 The legislation also proved to be tremendously expensive and
forced many foreign companies out of U.S. markets.110 Yet, it did nothing to curb
compensation for CEOs, which continued to rise. A survey of the compensation for the
CEOs at sixty-nine of the largest companies in the United States in 2002 saw a rise of
fifteen percent. Seventeen chief executive officers saw their restricted stock grants
increase by seventy-three percent.111
A survey of compensation paid to chief executive officers in 2003 saw another
increase, to an average of $8.6 million in payments.112 Some of those packages were
particularly impressive. Reuben Mark at Colgate Palmolive Co. received $141 million in
2003. Steven Jobs at Apple Computer received $74 million and George David at United
Technologies received $70 million. John F. Antioco at Blockbuster Inc., was paid almost
$20 million in salary between 1999 and 2004 in addition to uncounted millions in stock
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options. Blockbuster lost $3 billion during the period that he was receiving that
remuneration.113
More Option Scandals
The SEC reappeared in 2006 with more disclosure requirements for executive
compensation.114 That proposal arrived just in time to greet a new wave of options
scandals that commenced after a study by the Center for Financial Research and Analysis
that concluded that options were being backdated on a massive scale.115 Executives at
numerous public companies were caught up in scandals involving the backdating of their
option grants.116 Another study estimated that some 2,200 companies had been engaged
in this practice.117 Computer Associates admitted backdating back dating options for
periods of up to two years.118 Broadcom Corp. announced that it had under reported $1.5
billion in expenses between 1998 and 2003 as the result of backdated options and was
restating its accounts in that amount. Mercury Interactive Corp. announced a $525
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million restatement as the result of such practices.119 Cablevision Systems Corp. even
awarded options posthumously to a vice president through a backdating scheme.120
More than 100 companies were under investigation for this practice by September
2006.121 Three executives Comverse Technology Inc. were indicted for backdating
options.122 One of those executives made $138 million over a fourteen year period from
his options, of which about $6.4 million was from backdating.123 The SEC was also
targeting members of the compensation committee at Mercury Interactive who had
approved backdating options for an executive at that company.124
One study concluded that between 2000 and 2004 backdating increased the
average executive’s pay at 48 companies by a relatively miniscule 1.25 percent,
translating to $600,000. However, the market price of those companies stock dropped by
an average of 8 percent or $500 million after disclosure of those practices.125 That
probably reflects a shareholder base that is still spooked by the Enron era scandals. It is
also evidence of the politics surrounding executive compensation that drives public
opinion far more than its actual effect on company earnings.
The backdating scandal widened with the discovery that “spring loaded” options
were being granted to executives just in advance of the announcement of good news by
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the company.126 This practice was apparently widespread.127 The Wall Street Journal also
reported that some ninety public companies made large options grants to their executives
just after the terrorist attacks on September 11, at a time when stock prices were reduced
by the greatest percentage since the outbreak of World War II. The market recovered
after that attack, generating huge profits to those executives.128 Of course, that action
would appear to reflect a confidence in the company and the economy that the more timid
did not share and is commendable.

IV
MORE REFOMS

The War on Perks
A particular area of concern with compensation has been the perquisites given to
executives that range from the free use of the corporate jet to tickets to sporting events. In
the 1970s, Henry Ford II was lambasted in the press after it was revealed that he was
using company aircraft to ferry his wine and the family’s cats and dogs to various exotic
destinations.129 More entertaining is the case brought in 1980 by the SEC against Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. the publisher of a skin magazine and one time proprietor of night clubs
featuring scantily clad hostesses called “bunnies.”130 The SEC charged that Playboy, was
allowing Hugh Hefner, its founder and majority shareholder, to live at the company’s
mansions in Chicago and Los Angles without disclosing that Hefner was paying only a
126
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nominal of rent and that most of his living expenses were being picked up by the
company.
The SEC’s complaint against Playboy describes these luxurious accommodations
in detail, including the fact that the Chicago mansion had a dormitory that housed up to
thirty playboy bunnies. Hefner was also charged with having used the corporate jet,
named the “Big Bunny” for personal trips. The odd thing is the SEC must have been the
only male dominated organization in the country that was unaware of the fact that
Hefner’s life style at the mansions was being subsidized by Playboy and that the
company was using that life style as a giant publicity machine.
The Enron era scandals reached even greater heights. Dennis Kozlowski, the CEO
at Tyco International, became infamous after it was disclosed that the company had
purchased and furnished a luxury apartment for him in Manhattan, including an instantly
famous $6,000 shower curtain. Tyco also paid $2.1 million for a birthday party for
Kozlowski’s wife on the island of Sardinia, complete with Jimmy Buffett for
entertainment. Kozlowski was convicted and jailed for looting corporate funds after these
excesses were revealed.131
Another world class party thrower was Lord Conrad Black who headed the
Hollinger International chain of newspapers. Lord Black used corporate funds for a
birthday party for his wife at New York’s La Grenouille restaurant where eighty celebrity
guests were treated to Beluga caviar and 69 bottles of expensive wine. Lord Black also
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spent $28,000 on dinner parties for Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State.132 The
government is seeking $1.4 billion in damages from Black and his colleagues for their
alleged looting at Hollinger. A Canadian judge also found a way to curb Lord Black’s
spending. The judge ordered that Black and his wife spend no more than $50,000
Canadian per month pending the outcome of the litigation against them.133
The Rigas family who controlled Adelphia Communications Corp. also made
headlines with their prerequisites. Among other things, they were charged with using
corporate funds to pay for an African safari and with using corporate jets for shopping
trips and two pick up a Christmas tree. The latter errand actually required two trips
because the first tree was too short. John Rigas was given a 15 year prison term for his
role in that scandal, effectively a death sentence for that octogenarian cancer victim.134
Bernie Ebbers at WorldCom lived a laid back life style, but he owned a 130 foot
yacht, a 164,000 acre ranch and a hockey team that he moved the Mississippi where
WorldCom’s headquarters were located.135 Ebbers was convicted of fraud for his role in
the accounting manipulations at WorldCom and was sentenced to 25 years in prison,
which was a probable death sentence since he was suffering from heart problems. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York affirmed Ebbers conviction even though,
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as the court noted that: “Twenty-five years is a long sentence for a white collar crime,
longer than the sentences routinely imposed by many states for violent crimes, including
murder, or other serious crimes such as serial child molestation.”136
Jack Welch the venerated head of General Electric Co.(“GE”), was embarrassed
when it was revealed in his divorce proceedings that he was given many perks as a part of
his retirement package, including tickets to sporting events, use of a jet, and a car and
driver. The SEC sued GE for failing to disclose those perks in its financial reports even
though their total value was only some $2.5 million.137 Corporate jet use even became the
subject of two front page articles in the Wall Street Journal that carefully charted the use
of such aircraft for executive golf outings in Florida. Barry Diller appeared to be the
leading jet set executive, running up an $832,000 tab on the corporate jet in 2004.138 The
Internal Revenue Service and Congress have tried to make it more difficult to deduct the
use of corporate jet for personal use but that effort has not slowed executive travel.139
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Corporate perks remain front page news, as evidenced by a Wall Street Journal
report that News Corp. was paying $50,000 a month to rent an apartment for Rupert
Murdock, its chairman. However, Murdock was also being paid $25.7 million and could
have doubtlessly demanded more in lieu of this $600,000 perk.140
Alternate Compensation
After the options scandals, reformers began suggesting that longer term incentives
are needed. Some companies began experimenting with restricted stock.141 Such grants
require executives to remain with the company for some period of time and provide an
incentive to increase the value of the company’s stock over the long term. However, such
reforms are being circumvented by sophisticated financial tools. For example executives
at public companies were using “prepaid variable forward contracts” to sell their stock
holdings and gain tax advantages. In one such transaction, Don Ackerman, chairman of
WCI Communities, Inc., received $14 million from an investment banker for a base
amount of 500,000 shares of his company’s stock to be delivered three years later. The
number of shares to be delivered would be reduced if their share price increased but
would not have to deliver more if share prices fell.142
In another reform effort, the SEC broadened its efforts to curb executive
compensation in 2006. Those requirements sought to, once again, attack excess
compensation through more disclosure. The topic was a hot one, as evidenced by the over
20,000 comment letters received by the agency on its proposed changes. The
amendments as adopted expanded the executives whose compensation must be disclosed
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to include the principal executive officers, principal financial officers, other high paid
executives and members of the board of directors.143 The agency ran into controversy
after it was noted that, as originally proposed, the rules would have required disclosure of
the salaries of high paid anchor men and women at the television networks and sport
stars. This was quickly dubbed the Katy Kouric amendment, but the agency backed off to
require only disclosure of those employees with executive responsibilities.144
The SEC’s demand for full disclosure of executive salaries is a really bad idea, as
well as counter-intuitive. What is one of the most closely guarded secrets in the corporate
world? The answer is the compensation of non-hourly employees. Why is that? It is
because disclosure would reveal inequities in pay brought about by hard work, brilliance,
management skills, seniority, mentors or just plain unfairness. Disclosure would result in
a loss of morale as each employee would compare and view his or her self as being
unfairly treated. Some employees would quit, others would demand more pay and others
would simply lose interest in their job. The result would be increases in pay as each
employee demanded more than being received by another employee. The only solution
for compensation at lower executive levels would be a stratified compensation structure
for those employees provide that would provide no incentive for hard work, brilliance or
management skills and undermine the advancement of business.
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As it is at the upper executive level full disclosure has already touched off a wave
of competition for ever higher amounts of compensation. As noted in the New York
Times, the SEC’s executive compensation disclosure requirements only encourage
competition for larger compensation packages.145 Certainly, the expansion of those who
must disclose under the SEC’s recent rule amendments will only widen the demands for
ever increasing compensation and prerequisites. Disclosure had failed in the past why did
the SEC think it would now succeed. A study found that the five highest paid executives
at the 1500 largest publicly owned firms were paid $122 billion between 1999 and 2003.
In 2003, those payments were equal to almost 10 percent of those companies’ net
income.146 Moreover, average CEO compensation rose 27 percent in 2005 from the prior
year.147 Another study found that CEOs were paid 432 times more than the average
worker in 2004, up from 142 times the average worker in 1994.148
If further proof is needed that executive compensation is spiraling up
notwithstanding SEC full disclosure consider the fact that the Forbes magazine list of
400 richest Americans did not include a single millionaire in 2006. They were all
billionaires.149 Gross cases continued. Hank McKinnell, the head of the Pfizer
pharmaceutical company was paid almost $150 million in pay and pension benefits
during a period when the stock price dropped by 43 percent.150 A front page story in the
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New York Times in May 2006 showcased the $245 million paid by Home Depot to its
CEO, Robert Nardelli whose company’s stock price was stagnating.151

V
WHY BOTHER

What is Excessive?
The real issue in the debate over executive compensation is how to determine
whether compensation is excessive. That was the issue the court floundered over in the
Rogers v. Hill152 litigation. The current furor over the $187 million paid to Richard
Grasso, while he was the head of the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), is a case in
point. In addition to that package, six other NYSE executives had received annual
compensation over a five year period that exceeded $140 million. That is a lot of
money.153 However, unlike Michael Ovitz who contributed very little for his $140 million
compensation package for fourteen months work, Grasso was a long time employee of
the NYSE who worked his way through the ranks without even the benefit of a college
education.
Grasso kept the NYSE competitive in the face of severe threats from Nasdaq,
electronic communications networks and international trading. Despite that competition,
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NYSE market share in the stocks it listed for trading was eighty-five percent in 2001.154
Nasdaq lost 30 percent of its volume to electronic communications networks while the
NYSE lost only 7 percent.155 The NYSE provided its specialist members with profits of
$2.12 billion between 1995 and 2000.156 The price of NYSE memberships nearly doubled
during Grasso’s tenure and average daily trading volume increased from 179 million
shares in 1991 to about 1.4 billion shares in 2000. Grasso had also forcefully in reopening
the NYSE after the September 11 attacks.157
Some studies suggest that large compensation packages correlate to the market
capitalization of many public companies, i.e., the larger the company the greater the pay.
That makes some sense since the manager’s skills are tested by assembling and managing
a large enterprise.158 Another way to judge value is to compare pay at non-public
companies. That private (non-public company) sector provides a comparative base where
self-interest would presumably preclude excessive compensation. Yet, James Simmons, a
hedge fund manager, was paid an incredible $1.5 billion in 2005.159
In August 2006, VNU NV announced that it was hiring the vice chairman of the
General Electric Co. for a compensation package valued at $100 million. This was not
another instance of the looting of a public company. VNU is owned by private equity
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firms and that money was coming from the pockets of those sophisticated investors.160 In
fact, the Financial Times reports that executives at public companies are becoming hiring
targets for private equity. That newspaper reported that:
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, the buy-out firm, says more than a third of its 29 top
managers have experience as chief executive or chief financial officer of a public
company. Marc Lipschultz, a KKR partner, said: ‘When they join private equitybacked companies these executives can spend much more of their time on longterm business building rather than on quarterly earnings.’161
This talent search will no doubt remove the best of the managers from public
companies. At private equity firms they no longer have to worry about Sarbanes-Oxley
and SEC regulations that have sapped executive time, resulted in enormous expense,
driven foreign listings offshore, discouraged initial public offerings and caused
executives to abandon risk in favor of caution that will turn their companies into mere
bureaucracies. Private equity firms are even now raiding public companies and taking
them private. Those shrewd investors see nothing amiss in allowing the managers of
those companies to profit handsomely from the buyout and then award those same
executives with equity stakes in the acquired firm that will provide opportunity for even
greater profits.162
The marketplace can decide what is excessive and what is not. To be sure, the
market efficiency advocates are taking a beating from the behavioral school that posits

160

Kathryn Kranhold & Joann S. Lublin, “$100 Million Helps Lure Away General Electric Veteran,” Wall
St. J., Aug. 24, 2006, at B1.
161
Francesco Guerrera, “Private equity talent search leaves listed groups trailing,” Financial Times
(London), Aug. 30, 2006, at 1. Not all private equity pays so well since many of these entrepreneurs forgo
salary for large profits when they sell off assets. Nevertheless, the average employee at such firms was
being paid $777,000 in 2005. Rebecca Buckman, “Venture Firms Are Doling Out Large Pay Deals,” Wall
St. J., Sept. 14, 2006, at C1.
162
Henny Sender & Dennis K. Berman, “In Some Deals, Executives Get a Double Payday,” Wall St. J.,
Sept. 8, 2006, at C1.

36

that markets are affected by inefficiencies and even non-rational behavior.163 One
behavioralist has thus noted that:
Although a number of factors might affect CEO behavior, such as CEO age,
tenure, education, and socioeconomic background, I theorize that CEO
overconfidence is in important ways a product of corporate governance.
Corporate governance structure and practice in the United States is likely to lead
to CEO overconfidence in two key ways. The first relates to executive
compensation. A large executive compensation package gives positive feedback
to a CEO and signals that the chief executive is a success. Studies show that
positive feedback and recent success build confidence. In this view, the very
process of winning the tournament to become the top executive probably makes a
CEO more confident. Indeed, highly confident individuals presumably self-select
into the tournament to become CEO in the first place. The leading theoretical
approaches to executive compensation--which generally break down into the socalled ‘optimal contracting approach’ and the ‘managerial power approach’--try
to explain the size and design of executive compensation, while other approaches
focus on whether the size of CEO pay is ‘just’ or ‘fair’ as compared to what the
average worker receives. Stressing the possible link between CEO pay and CEO
overconfidence offers a new ‘behavioral approach’ to executive compensation
that is more concerned with the psychological consequences of executive pay-namely, the risk of bad business decisions, particularly overinvestment, rooted in
growing CEO confidence--than with the incentive effects or fairness concerns
associated with how and how much CEOs are paid.164
The problem with this over-confidence theory is that critics of the behavioral school
contend that those theorists are too pessimistic in their analyses.165
In all events, the issue of whether the market is as efficient as the Chicago school
claims or as inefficient as the behaviorists posit is theoretical only. The market is like a
democratic government. Everyone is allowed to express their views in a democracy by
voting at the ballot box. In a similar manner, market participants vote with their feet by
163
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selling or buying the stock (“the Wall Street rule”).166 In a democracy, some bad
presidents and members of congress are elected, bad laws are passed and inefficiency
abounds. This is because human beings are involved, and human beings make mistakes.
The market is no different. There will be periods of “irrational exuberance”167 and
depressions because of errors on the part of market participants. However, to paraphrase
Winston Churchill on democracy, it is the worst possible system except for any other.168
Certainly, the reformists and the SEC have proved that they cannot outperform
the market when it comes to executive compensation. A company that is overpaying its
executives will eventually fail or be crippled. A company that underpays will lose the
executives that made it efficient, and it too will suffer. So what happens to the investor in
the interim? Actually, nothing, if the investor is sufficiently diversified. Diversification
will bring both underpaying and overpaying companies into the portfolio as well as those
who have it just right.
Of course, this approach does not deal with the envy, jealousy or even outrage
that arises at each disclosure of a giant compensation package. There are a couple of was
to deal with those emotions. One is to view it as if the CEO won the lottery. Those
executives took huge risks and, and beyond the lottery winner, worked hard and battled
with sometimes Byzantine corporate politics to reach the pinnacle where they last on
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average only four years.169 If we do not resent lottery winners, why not treat the
executive the same way.170
The government and reformers should, in any event, remove themselves from the
business of trying to regulate executive compensation. This means that the SEC’s
executive compensation rules should be chucked. That would lessen the demand for ever
higher pay packages. Even in government disclosure of the income and assets of officials
is expressed only in terms of broad ranges under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978
that are almost meaningless.171 If disclosure is required at all for executive pay, it should
be in the form of total executive compensation and not focus on individuals. This will
allow shareholder monitoring to the extent there is such a thing. After these restrictions
are removed, compensation committees will be free to consider a broad ranger of
incentives.
Returning compensation to the marketplace would also mean the removal of the
limitation on deductibility of salaries. That would encourage increased salaries that will
allow the executive to focus on longer term strategies and lessen dependence on options
that are valued by short term quarterly earnings. The executives will be taxed on those
salaries and there is no reason why they should not be deductible.
Congress is finally waking to the fact that encouraging options over salaries
through their deductibility was a mistake. Incredibly, however, the focus in Congress is to
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limit deductibility of both rather than remove the restriction on salaries.172 Apparently
some congressional members seem to think this would act like a cap for all
compensation, further structuring public companies as government bureaucracies that
accept lower pay in exchange for job security. At the same time, those bureaucrats will
eschew all risk and accountability.
Congressman Barney Frank has introduced a “Protection Against Executive
Compensation Abuse Act” that would preclude deductions for executive compensation in
excess of more than 25 times the lowest amount paid to any employee. The present
average amount is more than 400 times the average worker.173 Such a limitation would
certainly drive anyone with any entrepreneurial skills away from the management of a
public company. In fact, limiting the deducibility of both options and salaries will seem
result in a tax increase on the shareholders because executives will still pay themselves
amounts far in excess of $1million.
On the plus side, executives may increase salary compensation since there would
no longer be a tax incentive to pay options instead of salaries, leading to more balanced
pay packets. For example, executive compensation could include a salary significant
enough to secure the allegiance of the executive and allow that executive to focus on the
long term goals of the company. That executive could also be given restricted stock to
secure those same goals and provide even greater incentive to manage in the long term.
Another part of a more balanced pay package could be options in an amount that
would also assure that the executive that a good quarter will be rewarded without pulling
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that executive from long term strategic plans. Of course, the particular mixture of
compensation will be in the hands of the executive committee. That committee will be in
a much better position to negotiate the appropriate compensation package if
unencumbered by artificial restrictions and unneeded disclosures.174

VI
CONCLUSION

Corporate reformers have attacked executive compensation over the years through
the “progressive” income tax code. Tax levels were almost confiscatory for several
decades but those taxes were largely avoided or evaded through a number of means. Tax
levels have now been lowered to more reasonable levels that have had the seemingly
incongruous result of raising tax collections. Corporate reformers have also held a dream
that limiting excessive executive compensation can be dealt with by first the stick in the
form of litigation than the carrot in the guise of options. Congress assisted in that
misguided effort by punitively taxing salaries over $1 million. That approach failed, as
witnessed by the orgy of compensation paid out to executives during the market run up in
the 1990s.
The SEC weighed in with the reformers but sought to use full disclosure as a way
to shame executives into not seeking excessive compensation. Both the SEC and the
reformers failed in curbing excessive compensation. Indeed, if anything, those efforts
174
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only spurred the ever increasingly large compensation packages. Undaunted, the SEC has
once again demanded more disclosures as a way to curb excesses. That effort no doubt
will also fail.
Finally, it is time to stop worrying about executive misuse of the corporate jet.
It is their toy. Most of them earned it, so let them play with it. Moreover, much business
is accomplished on the golf course and at expensive sporting events where those jets have
a tendency to travel. Corporate perks make great headlines,but are they really a serious
issue? They are not a large part of most compensation packages. Tyco might be an
exception but even the celebrated apartment bought by the company for Kozlowski’s use
was sold for a profit.175 In any event, corporate executives will simply demand an
increase in their compensation if they are taxed on those perks. So why bother?
It is time for the SEC and reformers to remove themselves from the compensation
picture. The market must decide these issues. The market is of course not perfect and
there will continue to be excesses. However, market discipline will at least provide some
checks on the excesses, unlike the efforts of the SEC and the reformers who have only
encouraged abuses. To the extent there is actual looting by executives, criminal
prosecutions should be sufficient punishment and deterrence for others.
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